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26.1 Introduction
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) hold the promise of saving tens of thousands of lives each year 
in the U.S., and many more worldwide, reducing traffic, saving energy, and providing 
mobility to those who cannot drive conventional cars. Nonetheless, AVs will inevitably 
have some accidents. On balance, AVs are likely to prevent many more accidents than they 
cause, but there will be at least some accidents involving AVs that would not have occurred 
with conventional vehicles.
Because of accidents involving AVs, some of which may be catastrophic, product liabil-
ity litigation1 is inevitable, especially in cases where conventional vehicles would not have 
crashed. The threat of massive product liability litigation involving AVs is widely perceived 
as one of the chief obstacles to AV development and sales, if not the number one threat [3].2 
Some believe that product liability suits may be an existential threat to autonomous driving 
[33].3 Crippling suits could force manufacturers to exit the market and may deter some 
manufacturers from entering the market because of a belief that the sales are not worth the 
risk. If these dire predictions come to pass, the U.S. and other parts of the world experienc-
ing a flood of lawsuits may lose the use of a technology that would save many times more 
lives than it would endanger. If, however, the industry finds effective ways to manage the 
risk of product liability, it can bring to market a lifesaving technology while maintaining 
practices to minimize accidents and resulting liability, as well as the profitability needed to 
offer AVs in the market over time.
The purpose of this chapter is to identify product liability risks in the U.S. to manu-
facturers of AVs, the source of those risks, and how manufacturers can manage those risks. 
A focus on U.S. product liability is important from a worldwide manufacturer’s perspective 
given the size of the U.S. market and the perception that the U.S. is a litigious country. 
Product liability is perceived as a greater threat in the U.S. than in any other country of 
the world. Section 26.2 discusses the circumstances giving rise to U.S. product liability 
litigation and the phenomenon of some U.S. cases resulting in huge awards to plaintiffs 
seeking compensation. It explains why these huge awards occur. Section 26.3 analyzes 
the human and financial impacts of more recent high profile product liability cases. 
Section 26.4 discusses U.S. product liability law, focusing on the types of claims and 
 defenses arising in product liability cases. Section 26.5 covers design practices and 
 procedures that manu facturers can use to reduce the risk of product liability, the use of 
1 This chapter focuses mainly on product liability litigation, although there are also requirements 
to compel vehicle manufacturers to recall their vehicles to fix defects. The management of 
 liability and recall risks overlap and the risk management principles discussed in this chapter 
apply to both.
2 “Some of the largest obstacles to autonomous consumer vehicles are the legalities [3].” Reports 
from Lloyd’s of London and the University of Texas listed product liability as among the top 
obstacles for AVs [21] [30].
3 “[T]he worst outcome would be that said liability isn’t sorted out so that we never do get the mass 
manufacturing and adoption of driverless cars.” [33] 
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insurance as a means of shifting and managing product liability risk, and other risk 
 management techniques.
26.2 Why do product liability suits occur?
First and foremost, manufacturers face product liability suits, because their products are 
involved in accidents. From the early days in the development of Anglo-American tort4 law, 
the road accident played a prominent role. A key British case in the development of U.S. 
tort law, Winterbottom v. Wright,5 involved a mail coach driver who was thrown from his 
horse-drawn mail carriage after it broke down, allegedly due to the defendant contractor’s 
failure to maintain the carriage in a safe condition [32].6
Starting in the 20th century, the car accident caused significant changes in U.S. product 
liability law. “Products liability, like America, grew up with the automobile. Prior to the 
entry of motorcars onto the nation’s highways, ‘there simply were not large numbers of 
product-related lawsuits.’ Once America embraced the automobile, it inevitably embraced 
automotive products suits as well.” [13] Two of the most significant products liability  cases 
in American history arose from auto accidents. In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., the 
famous American jurist Benjamin Cardozo writing for the New York Court of Appeals 
upheld a verdict for a car owner ejected from his Buick car after a defective wooden wheel 
on the car collapsed [22].7 In Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. [17],8 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict against Chrysler and a dealer after the wife of the 
purchaser had an accident. She testified that she felt something crack in the car, the steering 
wheel spun sharply, the car veered off the road, and the car struck a highway sign and 
brick wall.
The threadbare descriptions of the car accidents in these appellate courts’ decisions, 
however, do not reflect the reality of the trial setting in which lawyers for the injured plain-
tiffs will describe what might be a catastrophic car accident in unvarnished and sometimes 
horrific terms. Consider a description of the famous Ford Pinto accident written in Mother 
4 “Tort” means “wrong,” and “tort law” provides a mechanism for a plaintiff to seek redress in a 
civil (i.e., non-criminal) case.
5 It was common in the 19th century for American courts to cite contemporary British cases as 
precedents.
6 In Winterbottom, the court denied relief to the injured coachman because of a lack of direct 
contractual relationship, called “privity,” between the plaintiff coachman and the defendant 
contractor. The coachman was not a party the contract in which the defendant contractor prom-
ised to maintain the coach in good working order [32].
7 The plaintiff had bought the car from a retailer, but could still sue the manufacturer despite the 
lack of privity with the manufacturer [22]. The car was apparently going 8 miles per hour at the 
time of the accident [13].
8 The court rejected privity, a warranty disclaimer, and limits of liability as defenses to the  warranty 
claim of the wife driver of the car and her husband, the owner [17]. 
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Jones magazine. Although the description below comes from a writer,9 it is similar in tone 
and impact to what a plaintiff’s lawyer might say about his or her client in an opening 
statement. Here is how the writer describes the accident:
[A] woman, whom for legal reasons we will call Sandra Gillespie, pulled onto a Minnea polis 
highway in her new Ford Pinto. Riding with her was a young boy, whom we’ll call Robbie 
Carlton. As she entered a merge lane, Sandra Gillespie’s car stalled. Another car rear-ended 
hers at an impact speed of 28 miles per hour. The Pinto’s gas tank ruptured. Vapors from it 
mixed quickly with the air in the passenger compartment. A spark ignited the mixture and 
the car exploded in a ball of fire. Sandra died in agony a few hours later in an emergency 
hospital. Her passenger, 13-year-old Robbie Carlton, is still alive; he has just come home 
from another futile operation aimed at grafting a new ear and nose from skin on the few 
unscarred portions of his badly burned body. [11]
In the courtroom, the young boy, so badly disfigured by the accident, would likely be sitting 
next to his attorney during the entire trial. The jury would be seated facing him, and 
 watching him. The unspoken testimony of his catastrophic injuries would likely have at 
least an unconscious effect on the jurors watching him. Despite instructions from the judge 
not to permit sympathy, bias, or prejudice to sway their verdict, a car manufacturer defend-
ing this case would have an difficult time at trial. In the Ford Pinto case, the 13-year-old 
boy, whose real name was Richard Grimshaw, received a jury award in the amount of over 
$2.5 million in compensatory damages and an award of punitive damages to punish and 
deter Ford in the amount of $125 million [15]. Part of the motivation for the large verdict 
was evidence during the trial of Ford’s apparently cold-hearted decision not to use fairly 
inexpensive parts in its cars that would have prevented the accident. Although the punitive 
damages award was later reduced in this case to $3.5 million [15], the Ford Pinto case 
shows the kind of award that is possible in an automobile product liability case following 
a catastrophic accident.
At some future time when an AV manufacturer faces a product liability trial, we can 
expect to see accident victims seated in a courtroom with similar gruesome disfigurements 
and stories of out-of-control cars and tragic, frightful accidents. The defendant  manufacturer’s 
engineering and business practices will come under scrutiny. And a jury will likely decide 
whether or not the manufacturer should be held responsible for the accidents.
During an AV’s design phase, its manufacturer’s design team will have an opportunity 
to discuss and make engineering and business decisions about the design of its AVs. Team 
members will talk about safety efforts the manufacturer is willing to undertake. In these 
discussions, team members can think more clearly and assess risk more effectively by 
imagining themselves in a courtroom setting, defending their practices in litigation arising 
from a catastrophic accident.
9 The writer is using pseudonyms for the names of the crash victims, evidently before the names 
of the victims became public.
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Why are jurors willing to render these large verdicts against manufacturers? The short 
answer is juror anger. “Angry jurors mean high damages.” [24] More specifically, juries 
render large verdicts when they become angry at defendants’ conduct. When juries become 
angry, the only way that they see they can redress the defendants’ wrongs is to render 
very large verdicts against them in an effort to send a message that their conduct is unac-
ceptable.
In the Ford Pinto case, the jury heard evidence that Ford had known about the problems 
with its fuel system. Ford had found the problem of rear-end crashes splitting open the 
Pinto’s gas tank. In addition, Ford knew that a part costing $11 could have prevented the 
accident. Nonetheless, Ford made a cost/benefit analysis comparing the overall cost of 
adding the safety part to the vehicle against the value of the lives lost from accidents in-
volving the vulnerability. Ford assigned a value to each human life likely lost. And Ford 
decided that the overall cost of the part exceeded the overall value of the human lives 
that would be saved and determined that it therefore should not add the part to the Pinto’s 
design.
Ford’s cost/benefit calculation seemed odious to the jury because it placed a dollar  value 
on human life. In addition, the jury knew that the extra part would only cost $11. By not 
adding the part to the Pinto’s design, the jury evidently concluded that Ford placed its 
profits ahead of human life. Ford’s apparent callousness led to the jury anger [15].
In another famous product liability case, a Texas lawyer obtained a $253.5 million ver-
dict against pharmaceutical company Merck for Carol Ernst, the widow of Robert Ernst. 
Mr. Ernst died after having taken Merck’s painkiller Vioxx for eight months [5]. The jury 
saw internal Merck documents showing that the company was aware of the heart attack risk 
to users before it started marketing the drug. The documents gave the jury the impression 
that the company cared more about profits than public safety. As a result, the jury tried, 
via the huge award, to send a message that it is wrong to hide information about a drug’s 
danger [14]. Although an appellate court later overturned the jury’s verdict, again the case 
underscores the risk of huge product liability verdicts [23].
26.3 More recent high-profile product liability litigation
As noted in the previous section, appellate courts provided some relief to Ford and over-
turned the verdict in the Vioxx case. Nonetheless, manufacturers should look to two more 
recent sets of cases in order to analyze the potential human and financial impact of product 
liability issues. Section 26.3.1 covers the so-called “sudden acceleration” phenomenon 
involving Toyota cars. Section 26.3.2 describes the fallout from the General Motors ignition 
switch defects. These two cases show how manufacturers may need to pay huge sums to 
resolve product liability legal proceedings, which are in addition to the human toll of deaths 
and injuries.
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26.3.1 “Sudden acceleration” litigation
Several years ago, news stories emerged concerning a phenomenon in which Toyota drivers 
reported that their cars accelerated without warning and were difficult to stop, resulting in 
accidents. One typical news report stated, “Nancy Bernstein feels lucky to be alive after 
her Toyota Prius kept accelerating, no matter how hard she hit the brakes. ‘The car’s going 
about 70 miles an hour, and I’m beginning to get scared because it’s not slowing down,’ 
Bernstein described.” [26]. Lawsuits followed these accidents, and federal cases were 
transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for coordinated 
or consolidated pretrial proceedings [27].
Some reports contend that the 89 people may have died from accidents involving the 
sudden acceleration of Toyota vehicles [10]. Governmental investigations, however, 
showed no evidence that design or implementation flaws in Toyotas caused unintended 
acceleration [25]. Accordingly, there was some controversy about whether Toyota or  drivers 
were at fault in these accidents.
Later in the litigation, however, a report by expert witness Michael Barr following 
 additional research opined that a software malfunction occurred in one of the cars and that 
the malfunction resulted in unintended acceleration [4]. Barr identified numerous alleged 
problems with the software, which according to Barr, Toyota’s own engineers had trouble 
understanding and characterized as “spaghetti like” [4]. Barr testified about his findings in 
an Oklahoma state court case and, apparently based in part on these findings, the jury in 
the case awarded compensatory damages of $1.5 million to the driver and $1.5 million to 
the family of a passenger who died in the crash [35]. The parties in the case, Bookout v. 
Toyota Motor Corp. [7], settled the case right before a second phase of the trial to consider 
punitive damages against Toyota [18].
Despite the uncertainty about what really caused these accidents, Toyota started to settle 
the various legal actions against the company. The Oklahoma case may have been a moti-
vating factor [28].10 Toyota’s settlement payments so far include:
 $1.6 billion to settle financial loss claims in the multidistrict litigation [28].
 $1.2 billion to settle potential criminal charges against Toyota [29].
 $25.5 million to settle shareholder claims arising the failure to report safety issues [29].
 $65 million in fines for violations of federal vehicle safety laws [29].
These settlement payouts are in addition to the numerous product liability lawsuits that 
remain pending, the settlement of which presumably will cost a huge sum. If product 
 liability settlement amounts exceed $1 billion, then the total settlements may exceed $4 
billion. The cost of legal fees and other internal expenses related to investigation and reme-
dial measures will add even more to the final cost for Toyota.
10 “Legal analysts said that the verdict most likely spurred Toyota to pursue a broad settlement of 
its remaining cases.” [28]
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26.3.2 General Motors ignition switch issues and recall
Another high-profile product liability issue arose from the recently uncovered problem with 
ignition switches in certain General Motors cars. In the late 1990s, GM started using new 
switches for small cars to make them work more smoothly. “But as it turns out, new switch-
es in models such as the Chevrolet Cobalt and Saturn Ion can unexpectedly slip from ‘run’ 
to ‘accessory,’ causing engines to stall. That shuts off the power steering, making cars 
harder to control, and disables air bags in crashes [20]. The problem supposedly caused 
over 50 accidents. “GM says the problem has caused at least 13 deaths, but some members 
of Congress put the death toll near 100.” [20]
Apparently, GM engineers were aware of the problem before the accidents, but decided 
not to replace the switches. An internal email uncovered in Congressional hearings  discussed 
the fact that a more robust design would add 90 cents to the price of the switch, and would 
only save 10-15 cents in reduced warranty claims [16]. “The part costs less than $10 whole-
sale. The fix takes less than an hour. A mechanic removes a few screws and connectors, 
takes off a plastic shroud, pops in the new switch, and the customer is back on the road.” 
[12] “[T]o many people familiar with the automaker,” the reason GM did not recall the cars 
sooner “is a corporate culture reluctant to pass along bad news. When GM was struggling 
to cut costs and buff its image, a recall of its popular small cars would have been a terrible 
setback.” [12] “It’s pretty clear that somebody somewhere was being penny-wise and 
pound-foolish,’ said Marina Whitman, a professor at the University of Michigan and a 
former economist at GM.” [12]
GM’s decision not to recall the cars sooner is proving to be a costly one. Congress,  safety 
regulators, the U.S. attorney in New York City, the SEC, Transport Canada, and 45 state 
attorneys general are conducting probes of GM. GM is undertaking a costly recall of the 
cars. Also, GM created a compensation fund for families of crash victims, which it expects 
will cost the company $400 million to $600 million [19].
In addition to the compensation fund, GM said that it will spend $1.2 billion to repair the 
cars and trucks recalled during the second quarter, on top of the $1.3 billion it identified  
for repair costs in the first three months of the year. In addition, the company set aside an 
additional $874 million in the quarter for future recalls. [19]
The total expense for GM will be huge: “All told, GM’s recalls have cost the automaker 
nearly $4 billion this year.” [19] Presumably, GM will continue to pay more in future years 
as well. Moreover, GM will have to pay even more for legal fees and other internal  expenses 
related to investigation and remedial measures.
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26.4 Claims and defenses in product liability cases
Having covered the phenomenon of product liability litigation, the human toll of accidents, 
and the large financial risks involved, this section covers what plaintiffs must prove in 
order to prevail in a suit based on an allegedly defective product, as well as what defendants 
must prove in order to assert certain defenses. Typical claims for plaintiffs seeking 
damages for bodily injury or property damage from an accident are “strict product liability,” 
“negligence,” and “breach of warranty.”11 Most of the law governing product liability in 
the U.S. is state law, as opposed to federal law, and laws diverge from state to state.
26.4.1 Strict product liability claims
The easiest type of claim for a plaintiff to prove is a so-called “strict product liability” claim. 
A plaintiff can include in the suit almost every business in the chain of distribution from raw 
materials or component part manufacturers to manufacturers of the finished product, distrib-
utors, and retailers [13]. Strict liability refers to liability for defective products  without fault 
on the part of the manufacturer and regardless of whether or not there is a contractual rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and defendant. Laws vary significantly from state to state, and 
some states do not even recognize strict liability as a viable claim.  Nonetheless, most states’ 
statutory and common law strict liability laws are based on the formulation of strict liability 
under Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts [2].12 As stated in the Restatement, 
in order to win a strict liability claim, the plaintiff must prove at trial:
 The defendant sold the product in question,
 The defendant is in the business of selling this kind of product,
 The product was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time it left the 
 defendant’s hands,
 The product is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold, and
 The defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries [2].
The key issue for AV strict liability design defect claims will be whether the vehicle was 
“defective.” A plaintiff may assert that the product was defective in its design, the product 
was defective in the way it was manufactured, and/or that the defendant failed to provide 
11 Another theory of recovery for plaintiffs is fraud, also known as “deceit” or “misrepresenta-
tion,” and is based on false statements made by the seller about a product. Misrepresentations 
may be intentional, negligent (careless), or innocent. This type of claim, however, is the least 
used theory of recovery in the product liability context [13]. 
12 “More than three quarters of American jurisdictions incorporate all or part of this section in 
their own distinct brand of strict liability.” [13] Restatements of law summarize an area of law 
in the U.S., but do not themselves have the force of law.
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adequate warnings or instructions to the users of the product. Of greatest concern for AV 
litigation are design defect and failure to warn claims.
A plaintiff asserting a design defect would show the existence of a “defect” under the 
applicable state law test. Courts in the U.S. apply one of the following tests:
 A test based on what an ordinary consumer would expect from a product, typically used 
where the potential for injury is clear to consumers from the nature of the product.
 The risk-utility balancing test, where the plaintiff contends that the risks from a design 
outweigh the benefits to the consumer or public from a design.
 The product manufacturer test, which asks whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer 
or seller, aware of the product’s dangerous condition, would not have put the product 
on the market if it had been aware of the product’s condition.
 A combination test, which may shift the burden of proof to the manufacturer to show a 
lack of defect in certain situations.
 The ultimate issue approach, in which the jury has the discretion to determine whether 
a design is defective [31]. 
Frequently, a plaintiff asserting a design defect will use expert testimony to explain why 
the defendant’s design is defective and will attempt to prove that an alternative design could 
have prevented the accident.
In addition to relying on design defects, a plaintiff may also assert a strict liability claim 
based on a “failure to warn” theory. Under this theory, the plaintiff could contend that an 
AV was defective because the defendant failed to provide adequate warnings or instructions 
about the vehicle. The plaintiff would need to prove that the warnings did not adequately 
reduce risks associated with the product or that the instructions were inadequate to tell the 
user how to use the product.
26.4.2 Negligence claims
As an alternative claim, product liability plaintiffs often include a negligence claim in their 
complaints. The concept of “negligence” refers to careless conduct that falls below the 
standard of conduct to which a hypothetical “reasonable man” would adhere. As with strict 
liability, a plaintiff can assert a negligence claim based on the design of the product, the 
way in which the product was manufactured, or the failure to give adequate warnings or 
instructions. Negligence is a harder claim for a plaintiff than strict liability, because the 
plaintiff must show some degree of fault on the part of the defendant.
In order to prevail in a negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove:
 The defendant owed a duty of care to provide a reasonably safe product in terms  
of design or to warn of dangerous defects – meeting a standard of conduct to protect 
others against unreasonable risk,
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 The defendant breached its duty of care by failing to conform its conduct to the 
standard of conduct required, and
 The defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury [31].
26.4.3 Breach of warranty claims
In most states in the U.S., a plaintiff may also include a breach of warranty claim in a 
 product liability complaint. Warranties are affirmations or promises concerning a product 
or its performance, features, or characteristics, such as those concerning the safety of a 
product. The basis of a breach of warranty claim is that the seller’s product does not perform 
as promised, or does not have the features or characteristics promised. Design defects, 
manufacturing defects, or failures to warn may all provide the basis for a warranty claim. 
As with strict liability, the question is whether or not the product adheres to the promises 
made, regardless of whether the seller is at fault for the failure to conform to the promise. 
Nonetheless, warranty claims are subject to defenses with various degrees of effectiveness, 
including the historical defense of “privity” (plaintiff’s lack of contractual relationship with 
the defendant), the requirement that the plaintiff provide the seller notice of the breach, and 
the ability for sellers to disclaim warranties [31]. In most U.S. jurisdictions, purchasers of 
a product or their family members can sue companies in the chain of distribution under a 
warranty theory despite the lack of privity [31].
In order to assert a breach of warranty claim, a plaintiff must typically prove:
 The defendant made a warranty,
 The product did not comply with the warranty at the time of the sale,
 The plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by the defective nature of the product, 
and
 As a result, the plaintiff suffered damage [31]. 
A warranty claim will typically allege one of three kinds of warranties. “Express warran-
ties” are those actually stated by the seller, such as in a sales contract, warranty program 
documentation, advertisements, or sales collateral. They may be written or oral. In addition 
to the express warranties, the law will sometimes recognize two kinds of “implied warran-
ties” regarding the sale of consumer products that arise by operation of law, as opposed to 
anything the seller actually said.
One kind of implied warranty is the “implied warranty of merchantability.” This implied 
warranty requires the seller to make sure the product is fit for the ordinary purposes of such 
product. For instance, a consumer would expect that the head of a hammer would not fly 
off the first time it is used after purchase. This kind of implied warranty is the one most 
likely to be asserted against a seller of an AV in future cases. The second typical implied 
warranty is the “warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.” Where the seller knows the 
particular purpose for which the consumer will use the product, and the buyer is relying on 
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the skill and judgment of the seller to select and furnish suitable products, the law will 
 recognize an implied warranty that the product will be fit for that purpose. For instance, if 
a truck buyer tells a dealer’s sales representative that the buyer seeks a pickup that will be 
able to tow a trailer through mountainous off-road terrain, then the dealer is deemed to have 
warranted that the truck recommended by the sales representative can, in fact, tow the 
trailer off-road in the mountains.
26.4.4 Claims under consumer protection laws
Plaintiffs sometimes assert product liability claims under various consumer protection 
laws. State laws vary, and some states do not permit these laws to be used for personal 
 injuries [1]. They are commonly used when plaintiffs seek redress for alleged economic or 
financial losses, such as the diminution in the value of their products due to the alleged 
defect. Examples include California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) [8], False Advertis-
ing Law (FAL) [8], and Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) [9], as well as equivalent 
laws in other states. Claims under these statutes typically require plaintiffs to prove:
 A violation of the statute occurred
 That causes
 Injury to a consumer.
For instance, the UCL prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. 
The FAL bars untrue or misleading advertising practices. The CLRA prohibits a list of unfair 
business practices, such as misrepresenting the characteristics and qualities of a product.
26.4.5 Types of defects at issue in autonomous vehicle litigation
We do not yet have examples of cases filed against AV manufacturers to say what kinds of 
alleged defects will likely result in litigation. Nonetheless, the history of automotive litiga-
tion, discussions with those in the industry, and judgments about what is likely to come 
suggest that there will be many sources of potential defects that may give rise to product 
liability litigation. AVs will share some of these sources of defects with conventional 
 vehicles, but some of them will be unique to AVs. The lists of potential defects in this 
 section are not meant to be exclusive, and there are many possible sources of defects in 
conventional and autonomous vehicles.
Some possible design defects13 that AVs will have in common with conventional  vehicles 
include:
13 Another issue for manufacturers of finished products concerns their supply chains. Counterfeit 
or defective components may introduce manufacturing defects into AVs.
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 Mechanical or physical defects in various systems of the vehicles or their safety 
equipment, such as the use of materials that are not strong or thick enough,14 or an 
excessively high center of gravity subjecting the vehicle to rollovers.
 Defects in electrical components or systems other than sensors or control systems for 
autonomous driving, such as the use of wrong kind of components, problems in the 
performance of the components, or the lack of durability of the components.
 Software15 defects relating to systems other than sensors or control systems for 
autonomous driving, including information security vulnerabilities.
These defects will occur in both conventional and autonomous vehicles and thus existing 
law and litigation methods would apply to determine a manufacturer’s liability.
Nonetheless, AVs may experience defects that conventional vehicles do not. Again, they 
may be mechanical, electronic, or software.
 Mechanical or physical defects in the control systems for autonomous mode or the 
sensors used by the autonomous systems. A simple example would be weak mount-
ings for LIDAR sensors which, if they failed, might cause the AV to lose its sensor 
data suddenly and crash.
 Defects in electrical components for sensors or control systems for autonomous driving.
 Software defects in the sensors or control systems used for autonomous mode.
The most interesting and perhaps most concerning potential defects are those in the soft-
ware used for autonomous driving. Some examples include:
 Designs that depend on inadequate data from sensors, including insufficient amount, 
inaccuracy, deficient precision, or inadequate speed of data input.
 Inaccurate pattern recognition, such as the AV failing to be able to recognize a 
pedestrian in the road or other upcoming obstacles or hazards.
 Designs that fail to perform safe ordinary maneuvers such as turns, lane-keeping, 
distance-keeping, and merging.
 Other problems with autonomous behavior, such as unpredictable changes in speed  
or direction.
 Deficient collision avoidance algorithms.
 Information security vulnerabilities.
 Defects arising from inadequate human-computer coordination. For instance, if an AV 
switches between autonomous and manual mode, the AV must alert the driver before 
switching to manual mode and transition to human control safely.
14 For example, the author was involved in one case in which the plaintiff alleged that the metal in a 
car’s tie rod was not strong enough, the metal fatigue experienced by ordinary wear of the car 
weakened the tie rod, and an accident occurred because metal fatigue caused the tie rod to break.
15 The “software” involved may be in the form of code built into hardware or firmware.
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Moreover, Chapter 4 discusses design decisions programmers must make when creating 
the logic for an AV to handle the situation of when a collision is imminent and unavoidable 
and there is a choice between striking and harming different persons. For instance, an AV 
may face the dilemma of striking a motorcycle rider wearing a helmet or one without a 
helmet, and a programmer might decide that it is better, if a collision is unavoidable, to 
strike one or the other. If the programmer makes such a decision and designs the software 
to implement that decision, this kind of design decision could be the subject of a product 
liability suit from the person struck by operation of the software.
26.4.6 Defenses in product liability cases
Defendants may assert a number of defenses against a product liability case. The most com-
mon types of defenses relate to the conduct of the plaintiff. In some cases, the defendant 
contends that the plaintiff’s negligent conduct caused or contributed to an accident. The 
viability of a defense based on a plaintiff’s own negligence depends on state law and the type 
of claim, but a defendant may also use it as evidence of a superseding cause of an accident. 
In addition, some accidents occur because a plaintiff misused or modified a product. In some 
cases, a plaintiff is said to have “assumed the risk” of an open, obvious hazard, such as the 
possibility of being struck by a golf ball on the links. Finally, a plaintiff may not be able to 
recover all damages if he or she failed in some way to mitigate the damages.
Many of these defenses may have limited application to persons driving AVs in auton-
omous mode. If the plaintiff was not in control of the vehicle at the time of the accident, 
the plaintiff could not have driven carelessly. Once AVs enter the mass market, a seller 
cannot realistically contend that the plaintiff assumed the risk of driving a vehicle using 
new and untested technology. Nonetheless, it is likely over time that some people will 
modify their AVs or try to abuse the sensors or control systems for fun. In these cases, if an 
accident occurs, the defendant may point to this conduct as a defense. Moreover, defenses 
based on a plaintiff’s conduct could reduce or bar a plaintiff’s recovery when the plaintiff 
was not a driver of the AV, such as a pedestrian carelessly (or intentionally) darting out in 
front of an AV faster than any human or machine could react.
The other key defense in AV litigation will likely be a “state of the art” defense to a 
design defect claim. The basis of this defense is that the manufacturer could not have pro-
duced a safer design at the time of sale because safer designs were not technologically 
feasible then. Such a defense is valid in some states while not in others [13].16 
16 Another typical product liability-specific defense is the economic loss doctrine, which bars 
product liability tort claims where the claimed damages are financial and not for bodily injury 
or damage to property other than the product itself. Moreover, federal law may preempt some 
state law claims, because U.S. federal law trumps state laws inconsistent with it. Also, if a 
product is meant to be used by a “sophisticated user” or provided by a “sophisticated interme-
diary,” the seller may have a defense under certain circumstances, although this defense is un-
likely to apply to AVs. Finally, if a manufacturer creates a product pursuant to government 
specification, it may have a “government contractor defense.”
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26.5 Managing the risk of autonomous vehicle product liability
Having covered the nature of product liability, the potentially huge exposure for losses, 
juror anger that leads to huge jury verdicts, and the nature of product liability, I now turn 
to the issue of how manufacturers can manage the risk of product liability litigation.17 
First and foremost, managing these risks requires a proactive approach. By planning 
today, manufacturers can be prepared for the inevitable suits later. First, planning can 
 enable them to make safer products that are less likely to cause litigation-triggering acci-
dents in the first place. Second, by planning ahead, manufacturers can increase their chanc-
es of winning the cases that accidents do trigger. A proactive approach to design safety with 
a comprehensive risk management program establishes upfront a manufacturer’s commit-
ment to safety. When the inevitable suit happens later, the manufacturer’s counsel has a 
story to tell the jury as to why its products were safe and how the manufacturer cared about 
safety.
Second, manufacturers should consider the commitment they make to product safety 
using such a proactive approach. One commentator stated, “The most effective way for 
[counsel for] a corporate defendant to reduce anger toward his or her client is to show all 
the ways that the client went beyond what was required by the law  or industry practice.” 
[24]. Meeting minimum standards is insufficient because of juror skepticism about the 
rigor of standards set or influenced by industry and because jurors expect corporate clients 
to know more about product safety than a “reasonable person” – the standard for judging 
the conduct of defendants under the law [24]. “A successful defense can also be supported 
by walking jurors through the relevant manufacturing or decision-making process, showing 
all of the testing, checking, and follow-up actions that were included. Jurors who have no 
familiarity with complex business processes are often impressed with all of the thought 
that went into the process and all of the precautions that were taken.” [24] Even though 
accidents do occur, and in any trial setting an accident or problem did occur, a defendant’s 
proactive approach would show the jury that the manufacturer tried hard to do the right 
thing [24]. Consequently, efforts to go above and beyond the minimum standards would 
diffuse juror anger and mitigate the manufacturer’s risk.
Third, manufacturers should recognize that risk management is a process that begins 
with a careful risk analysis looking at the types, likelihood, and impact of issues in the 
design of AVs. Once a risk assessment is complete, they can review the results and analyze 
changes in design and engineering practices to address these issues, prioritize risks and risk 
mitigation measures, and implement the prioritized risk mitigation measures [34]. In 
 connection with the risk management process, manufacturers can obtain guidance from a 
number of standards bearing on risk management and safety:
17 I speak here of product liability litigation, although the risk management techniques here also 
apply to preventing the need for costly product recalls.
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 ISO 31000 “Risk management – Principles and guidelines” (regarding the risk 
management process).
 Software development guidelines from the Motor Industry Software Reliability 
Association.
 IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 
safety-related systems (safety standard for electronic systems and software).
 ISO 26262 family of “Functional Safety” standards implementing IEC 61508 for the 
functional safety of electronic systems and software for autos.
While adherence to the principles of international standards does not guarantee that an 
AV manufacturer will avoid liability, adherence to standards bolsters the credibility of a 
manufacturer’s risk management program. Moreover, the standards provide a framework 
by which manufacturers can build a set of controls for their risk management process. 
Consequently, an AV safety program built on international standards lays the foundation 
for a later defense of a manufacturer accused of building an unsafe AV.
Fourth, AV manufacturers should obtain insurance coverage to manage product liability 
risk. A robust insurance program will permit manufacturers to shift the risk of product 
 liability to insurance carriers who will, under issued policies, defend and indemnify man-
ufacturers for settlements and judgments paid to resolve third party claims. Currently, the 
insurance industry is just beginning to come to grips with the insurance implications of AVs 
[21]. We can expect to see the insurance industry provide third party coverage to manu-
facturers for accidents, and probably privacy and information security risks as well. While 
the industry has no historical data for an actuarial approach to underwriting AV risks, the 
industry will probably look by analogy to conventional vehicles and mobile devices for loss 
experiences [6]. AV manufacturers can find carriers willing to write bespoke policies tailor- 
made to their needs. Eventually other carriers will enter the market and offer more stan-
dardized polices, thereby reducing premium costs to manufacturers over the long run.
Fifth, manufacturers can work together on industry risk management initiatives, such as:
 Participation in standards efforts to promote safety and security within the industry 
and among component manufacturers;
 Collaborating with other manufacturers in trade groups and (subject to antitrust 
concerns) purchasing consortia; with the purchasing power of larger numbers of 
manufacturers, the industry may have greater leverage with component manufacturers 
to promote safe design and manufacturing processes; and
 Participation in information sharing groups that can collaborate to develop best 
practices to improve product safety.
Sixth, manufacturers can manage the risk of huge jury awards by certain pre-litigation 
strategies. For instance, they may want to engage jury consultants that assist the defense of 
product liability cases to identify risk factors for the manufacturer and the types of conduct 
that trigger juror anger. In addition, manufacturers may want to identify and cultivate a 
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group of defense experts they can use to educate jurors about various engineering, infor-
mation technology, and safety considerations. Moreover, counsel for manufacturers may 
want to join specialty bars for defense counsel for purposes of sharing information, briefs, 
and other work product.
Finally, manufacturers can maximize their success in future product liability trials by 
focusing on effective records and information management (RIM). Effective RIM may win 
cases, while poor RIM may lose cases. Documents and records produced contemporane-
ously with the management of a safety program can corroborate the testimony of witness-
es, provide a historical record documenting a manufacturer’s safety efforts, and send the 
message that the manufacturer cares about safety.
26.6 Conclusions
One of the top, if not the top, challenge autonomous vehicle manufacturers face is the risk 
of product liability suits and recalls in the wake of accidents resulting in deaths and cata-
strophic injuries. Lawsuits in which manufacturers appear callous, placing profits over 
 safety, face the risk of huge liabilities. Recent reports about “sudden acceleration” in  Toyota 
cars and problems with General Motors’ ignition switches show that these companies are 
paying multiple billions of dollars to resolve legal claims. Plaintiffs have a number of 
claims they can assert against AV manufacturers, although manufacturers may have defens-
es as well. Various kinds of defects may crop up with AVs, although problems with soft-
ware, logic, autonomous behavior, and programmer decisions on AV behavior in crashes 
are top concerns. Nonetheless, manufacturers can manage product liability risk through 
careful planning, a strong commitment to safety, an effective risk management process 
beginning with a thorough risk analysis, adherence to international standards, obtaining 
robust insurance coverage, collaboration with other manufacturers, pre-litigation legal 
strategies, and effective records and information management practices. In sum, the threat 
of crippling product liability litigation in the United States poses a profound concern for 
manufacturers of autonomous vehicles, but starting proactive engineering design strategies 
for safety risk management and legal strategies to anticipate future litigation now can place 
manufacturers in the best position to maximize product safety and minimize product liabil-
ity in upcoming decades.
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